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The Place of Strategic Environmental Assessment 
in the Privatised Electricity Industry 
 
Summary 
The private sector has given relatively little attention to the emergence of strategic environmental 
assessment (SEA); even recently privatised utilities, where SEA might be deemed particularly 
appropriate, and whose activities are likely to fall within the scope of the European Union SEA Directive, 
have shown less interest than might be expected.  However, the global trend towards the privatisation of 
state-owned enterprises makes the adaptation of SEA towards these industries all the more pressing.  
This paper addresses the place that SEA might take within the electricity sector, taking the privatised UK 
electricity industry as an example.  Particular challenges are posed by the radical restructuring of the 
industry, designed to introduce competitive behaviour, making the development of comprehensive SEA 
processes problematic, and requiring SEA to be placed in the context of corporate environmental policy 
and objectives. 
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Introduction 
 
The concept and practice of Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) has attracted increasing 
international interest over the last decade from government, academia and industry. SEA concepts have 
been developed, and practice has been extending into a range of sectors internationally (Fischer & 
Seaton 2002).  However, this growing awareness and application of SEA has, for the most part, been 
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restricted to public sector activities, or institutional contexts such as development funding.  In the UK, 
SEA approaches have become predominately established within public land-use and sectoral planning, 
and some funding activities (Thérivel 1998, 2004), with relatively little practical attention being given to 
SEA in the private sector (Marshall 2003).  This is partly due to the current lack of regulatory 
requirements for SEA within industrial sectors, whereas there has been a growing body of policy 
supporting and promoting SEA in more public contexts.  This absence of a perceived need for SEA in the 
private sector stands in contrast to the early, voluntary take-up of environmental impact assessment 
(EIA) by some industrial concerns such as the oil and energy sectors (Glasson et al 1999).  Only recently 
has SEA started to be explored by private companies as a potential means of contributing towards their 
environmental performance, and as a practical tool to facilitate business objectives.  In this context, 
Marshall (2003) has drawn attention to the relationship between SEA and business practice, and has 
suggested that it must be clearly demonstrated that SEA can contribute to a company’s aims, and be 
integrated into the decision-making processes by which business solutions are sought. 
 
One important sector of industry where it might be expected that SEA practice should become quickly 
established is that of recently privatised industries.  Many of these are former public service utilities, 
engaged in the planning of large-scale and environmentally sensitive infrastructure, of the kind that 
might normally be subject to SEA.  For instance, the list of sectoral activities falling within the scope of 
the European Union ‘SEA Directive’ includes several that are increasingly being transferred to the private 
sector, such as waste management, energy, forestry, telecommunications and water (EC 2001).  There is 
evidence of SEA practice developing within some of these, especially the water industry (Byron & Sheate 
1997), but experience elsewhere is limited.  There remains an urgent need to develop forms of strategic 
environmental planning within these industries. 
 
This need is heightened by the accelerating global trend towards the privatisation of state-owned 
enterprises (Parker & Saal 2003).  OECD countries, especially, have been engaged in large-scale 
programmes of privatisation over the last twenty years (OECD 2001), to the extent that some now retain 
few saleable assets.  The UK has been in the vanguard of this movement, with the proportion of GDP 
accounted for by its remaining nationalised industries dropping from 9% in 1979 to less than 2% in 1997 
(Parker 1998).  Non-OECD countries have also embarked upon significant programmes of privatisation.  
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However, little attention has been given to the challenges that the transfer of assets from public to 
private sector ownership might pose for the development of SEA practice (DETR 1998).  Yet it could be 
hypothesised that with their inherited public service functions, remaining statutory obligations and 
strategic scales of operation, these newly commercialised organisations are relatively well placed to 
adopt SEA.  Moreover, they hold the potential, given their commercial and public interest issues, to form 
a bridge between the public and private sectors with regard to the development of SEA. 
 
We therefore seek to examine in this paper the character of one of the newly privatised utility industries 
and the possible place of SEA processes within it.  The UK electricity industry has been chosen, as an 
activity that has experienced a radical form of privatisation designed to maximise the degree of 
commercial competition within it, and as one that falls within the broader context of the energy sector, 
included in the scope of the EU SEA Directive.  Privatisation of this sector in the UK has involved major 
restructuring, including its break-up from a national entity into approximately 30 component parts.  One 
of the key concerns of this paper is to explore possible locations for SEA within these new structures, and 
the broader implications of the objectives of privatisation for environmental planning.   Initially, 
however, we review the extent to which SEA has already been practiced within the energy and electricity 
sectors, as a means of introducing the limitations and aspirations appearing with regard to SEA in this 
sector. 
 
 
SEA and the Energy Sector 
 
The energy sector has, for some time, been seen as an obvious candidate for the application of SEA.  
Certain of its characteristics give added weight to the need for SEA, such as the central importance of 
energy to national economies, the significant environmental issues associated with energy supply and 
use, and the growth in the use of renewable resources (Thérivel, et al 1992, Sheate 1996).  However, 
practice has been slow to develop in the sector, with relatively few examples documented.  Where SEA 
has been carried out, it has focused either on broad-level energy policy, or on narrowly-defined 
components of the industry. 
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At policy level, an early SEA was carried out of the Netherlands’ national electricity supply plan by 
government departments in 1992.  The plan provided policy direction for the country’s fuel mix, and 
indicated locations for plant and transport facilities.  The SEA involved the consideration of different 
energy scenarios, and provided restrictive criteria for the siting of power stations (Sheate 1996).  Other 
SEAs of energy policy have also made use of scenario analysis, especially with regard to energy supply 
and use, in which the likely effects of different energy mixes and degrees of energy conservation have 
been assessed.  Recent examples, conducted by national governments, are to be found in both 
developing and transition countries: Pakistan, the Czech Republic and Slovakia (Dalal-Clayton & Sadler 
2005).  A multi-criteria analysis of Canadian energy policy scenarios has also been carried out by Noble 
(2002).  In the UK, a report by the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution (RCEP) on energy 
prospects (2000), although not referred to as an SEA, similarly considers a range of scenarios, and 
advocates a long-term strategy aimed at massive reduction of carbon dioxide emissions.  A number of 
analytical approaches have been tested on a Swedish energy-related tax proposal by Nilsson et al (2005). 
 
These approaches to SEA, often theoretical and assessing purely hypothetical scenarios, are open to 
criticism as having little political or practical credibility.  They may also assume an unrealistic degree of 
centralised control over the implementation of policy, and fail to recognise the increasingly 
disaggregated and independent commercial nature of the sector.  Even if the consideration of visionary 
alternatives is seen as a legitimate role for SEA, with the aim of shaping national policies, the generation 
of scenarios must take into account the structure and operation of the industry, and have in mind some 
means of transferring from present to possible future configurations.  Nonetheless, it is consistent with a 
hierarchical model of environmental assessment that the presentation of scenarios should seek to 
influence downstream decision-making processes.  So, for example, in the UK, the RCEP study indicates 
some far-reaching consequences of possible policy shift for electricity networks, especially the likely 
need for: 
• extensions of the transmission network to remote, major sources of renewable energy; 
• networks to be better adapted to intermittent sources and embedded generation; 
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• the development of storage facility, or the maintenance of fossil fuel plant, to meet temporary 
shortfalls in intermittent sources. 
The point is made that these represent major challenges for the industry, which do not appear to have 
been fully appreciated (RCEP 2000). 
 
With regard to the SEA of specific components of the energy sector, some examples from the 1990s have 
been documented, including the analysis of clean coal technologies in the USA (Byron & Sheate 1997), 
comment on a Swedish municipality’s energy plan (EC 1997), and the potential for wind farm 
development in a German district (Kleinschmidt & Wagner 1996).  More recently, SEA has been adopted 
as a means of assessing the effects of offshore energy development: for exploration drilling in the UK 
North Sea (DTI 2001) and the Gulf of Mexico (EPA 2004), the petroleum industry in the Canadian Atlantic 
(Environment Canada 2004) and for UK offshore wind energy (DTI 2002, BMT Cordah Limited 2003).  
Some of these SEAs are strongly EIA-based, providing technical analyses of proposed activities, with 
primary emphasis, in the case of the DTI studies, on baseline data.  SEA is also being carried out of a UK 
regional study of renewable energy resources, sponsored by regional government, though here an 
objectives-led approach is being taken (Levett-Therivel 2003). 
 
SEA practice within the energy sector has, therefore, been limited in scope, with the emphasis firmly 
upon energy supply, and with some attention being given to energy conservation; no direct interest 
(except from the RCEP) has been shown in electricity networks.  Moreover, SEA has been restricted 
almost entirely to public strategies and carried out by public agencies, especially government bodies with 
clearly defined energy-related responsibilities.  There is no evidence of SEA being taken up 
comprehensively by the energy industry.  This is of some concern, given the international trends of 
privatisation and liberalisation of the sector, and the concomitant loosening of regulation, over, for 
example, the siting of plant.  Even in the UK, where liberalisation of the industry has advanced the 
furthest, explicit SEA practice has been applied only to offshore resources, where the public ‘ownership’ 
of those resources, not to mention their environmental sensitivity, imposes a need for strict regulation of 
future exploitation. 
 
SEA in the Privatised Electricity Industry 
 7
 
Privatisation of the UK Electricity Industry 
 
Privatisation can broadly be defined as “the shifting of a function, either in whole or in part, from the 
public sector to the private sector" (Butler 1991, p 17).  Most of the UK’s major utilities underwent this 
process between the mid 1980s and the mid 1990s, during the time of consecutive Conservative 
governments.   Privatisation is not a single measure, but can take many different forms, representing 
varying degrees of relinquishment of state control (Hodge 2000).  Initiatives in the UK have generally 
involved the sale of assets, eventually leading to total private ownership and high levels of independence 
for the new companies.  However, the structures created through privatisation have not been uniform in 
the UK.  One of the earlier privatisations, of the gas industry, was based on a unitary model, leading to 
the neo-monopoly of British Gas.  But in subsequent programmes, a concerted attempt has been made 
to introduce competition from the outset, through the restructuring of industries into smaller, inter-
competing elements – hence the complex de-integration of the railway industry.  A radical approach was 
also taken to the electricity industry, where the aim to shift to a competitive environment was given 
additional force by a political desire to diversify energy supply and reduce dependence on coal (Surrey 
1996, Thomas 1996a). 
   
Electricity Sector Restructuring and Competition 
 
Under the UK nationalised electricity industry, electricity generation and transmission were the 
responsibility of the Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB), while distribution and supply were in 
the hands of regional electricity boards
1
.  The Electricity Act 1989 provided for the near-complete 
privatisation of the sector in 1990-91.  In England and Wales, vertical de-integration of the industry took 
place, with different bodies becoming responsible for generation (National Power and PowerGen), 
transmission (National Grid Company), and distribution and supply (twelve regional companies).  The 
nuclear industry remained in public ownership, with part privatisation in 1996.   In Scotland, a less radical 
restructuring took place, as vertical integration of the industry was retained within Scottish Hydro-
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Electric and Scottish Power.  Different arrangements again were applied in Northern Ireland; these are 
not considered further here. 
 
The principle of competition was not applied across the whole of the broken-up industry.  Transmission 
and distribution activities were recognised as natural monopolies, and have continued as unified 
operations, run by regulated companies.  Competition was introduced at the points of generation and 
supply. With regard to generation, electricity could be purchased at competitive prices from individual 
generators; a spot market, known as the Pool, was created, by which generators making the lowest bids 
were scheduled to meet anticipated demand  (this has recently been replaced with a different system – 
see below.)  This market was opened to new entrants, both in the sense of new power plant constructed 
by existing generation companies, and in the sense of new companies entering the business.  There are 
two important consequences of this for electricity infrastructure.  Firstly, competitive bidding has 
favoured the generation of cheaper electricity from gas rather than coal; this resulted in the closure of 
many coal fired stations and the construction of a large number of new gas-fired power stations (the 
‘dash to gas’).  This, in turn, has led to significant reductions in carbon emissions and other pollutants, a 
move that has been commented on as an environmental benefit of electricity privatisation (MacKerron & 
Watson 1996).  This was a fortuitous consequence, however; allied more closely to the nature of 
privatisation was the prioritising of the economics of energy supply over other considerations such as the 
environmental and social impacts of siting new plant.  Secondly, because new power plant, once 
approved, has the right of connection to the grid, the transmission companies have had no planning 
function with regard to generation other than the construction of connecting lines.  This places them in 
the position of simply reacting to the initiatives of generation companies, and makes the strategic 
planning of their networks more problematic. 
 
Generation has not been completely thrown open to the free market, however.  Firstly, nuclear power 
has been protected from competition (by being subsidized through a ‘fossil-fuel levy’ on electricity 
prices).  Secondly, renewable energy has received favourable treatment, currently through an obligation 
on suppliers to purchase a proportion of their electricity from renewable sources (via a system of 
‘renewable obligation certificates’).  This exemplifies a continuing measure of government involvement 
in the industry. 
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In Scotland, the newly privatised companies were initially allowed to retain the complete energy chain 
within their areas, so that generation and transmission continued to be held within the same companies.  
There are a number of possible reasons for this, such as the smaller scale of the industry and an 
electorate hostile to the programme of privatisation (Thomas 1996a).  It has sometimes been argued 
that not ‘unbundling’ the system in Scotland has obstructed the aims of privatisation (Newbery 2002), 
though regulatory requirements have ensured uncontested access to the grid from new entrants to the 
generation business. 
 
With regard to supply, competition took off after 1995, after which electricity could be bought from 
competing suppliers – either the marketing entities of the original distribution companies, or new 
suppliers who entered the market. Initially, only heavy users of electricity had access to competing 
suppliers, but the freedom to ‘shop around’ was progressively extended to all consumers, further 
encouraging competitive activity.  This has resulted in a reduction in energy costs for consumers, a move 
anticipated by the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets (Ofgem), whose primary remit is to protect 
consumer’s interests and to promote competition of this kind.  The opening of the energy supply market 
place also unleashed a wave of mergers, takeovers of the companies, and the entry of new players into 
the supply business (Sadler 2001). 
 
Although it is difficult to identify any direct consequences that competition at the point of supply might 
have for the strategic planning of electricity infrastructure, there are questions about the difficulty of 
passing onto consumers non-essential costs, such as environmental improvements in the network.  
Indeed, there is a perception within the electricity industry that Ofgem will not countenance expenditure 
on environmental measures in infrastructure development, such as the placement of electricity lines 
underground (Cowell 2004).  A second area in which the supply market could have consequences for 
electricity infrastructure is in the development of renewables.  Supply companies now have to source a 
proportion of their supply from a renewable component, which many supply companies market under 
so-called green tariffs or funds.  Theoretically, the take-up of these schemes could drive the further 
development of renewables, though the extent to which customer behaviour of this kind will push 
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suppliers beyond what is already required of them under their renewables obligations remains to be 
seen. 
 
Currently, trading arrangements are being extended across the whole of Great Britain, to form a single 
market in electricity (the British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangements).  This involves the 
replacement of centrally administered trading by bilateral trading between suppliers and generators; 
suppliers make estimates of forthcoming demand, based on their sales expectations, and contract 
directly with generators to meet their requirements. This represents a further decentralization of the 
industry, which recognises the increasingly competitive environment of generation and supply, and 
allows for more flexible responses by the many players involved to constantly fluctuating market 
conditions (Littlechild 2003). 
 
Sectoral Internationalisation 
 
Accompanying this progressive liberalisation of the industry has been a growing internationalisation of 
the sector, with companies at all levels of the industry investing overseas, or finding themselves the 
object of international takeovers.  There has also been some vertical re-integration of components of the 
industry, with generation companies expanding into the distribution business (Sadler 2001), and some 
horizontal integration of businesses into other utilities. More complex configurations have started to 
emerge within the last decade in which umbrella corporations own a portfolio of related UK and 
international energy business interests.  Infrastructure planning and environmental matters may 
therefore come under the increased influence of corporate thinking; for example, it is likely that 
environmental performance criteria will be shaped by overarching environmental policy drawn up at 
corporate level.  Interestingly, Jennings (1999) found that the evolution of single business electricity 
companies to more diverse, international corporations has led to more difficult business environments, 
that then encourage a stronger role for corporate planning.  Referring to PowerGen as a case study, he 
noted that industry and geographic diversification, increasing levels of competition, and the 
responsiveness of the regulator to competitive conduct, have created a complex environment that the 
company has been seeking to negotiate through the greater use of planning.  Although planning of this 
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kind is primarily concerned with resource allocation, it is conceivable that environmental considerations 
could begin to find a place within it.  
 
It should be noted that the changes in the electricity industry described above for the UK have been 
paralleled throughout the world.  Indeed the UK, with some Scandinavian countries, has pioneered the 
transformation of centrally controlled monopolies to competitive electricity markets.  There are 
significant variations in the way in which this has been carried out, but common elements have become 
widely established, namely competing generators, separate transmission and distribution bodies, third-
party, non-discriminatory access, a retail market open to competition, and an independent regulatory 
body (Littlechild 2003).  Some or all of these elements are now in evidence in a growing number of 
countries around the world, accompanied by internationalisation of the industry (Dubash 2003).  Within 
the European Union, a clear commitment has been made to advancing the restructuring of the industry, 
through the 1996 Electricity Directive, by which the electricity market is being progressively opened up 
to competition, and through a decision of the European Council in 2000 to accelerate the pace of 
liberalisation, with a view to developing a pan-European market in electricity (Geradin 2002). 
 
 
The Implications of Privatisation for SEA within the Electricity Industry 
 
Loss of Centralised Planning 
 
Through privatisation, the overriding change to the electricity industry has been the loss of central 
planning by a unified body (the CEGB) with responsibility for both generation and transmission acting 
collaboratively with the distribution networks.  Although strategic environmental planning had not been 
a feature of the nationalised industry, centralised financial planning had been developing (Jennings 
1999), and it could be argued that the potential existed for a hierarchical, forward planning regime, of 
the kind envisaged by early proponents of SEA (Lee & Walsh 1992, Wood & Djeddour 1992).  The loss of 
the CEGB, at precisely the time when SEA ideas were emerging, has effectively undermined the possible 
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creation of a comprehensive SEA system for this industrial sector.  The aspirations of some 
commentators for a tiered series of SEAs to be applied vertically throughout a sector like the electricity 
industry (eg. Fischer et al 2002) are therefore problematic, in that the institutional unity or framework 
for administering a system of this kind is now absent. 
 
Nonetheless, overarching assessments of the industry are conceivable through the SEAs of energy policy, 
such as those referred to above, which represent attempts to shape the configurations of future energy 
capacity and use.  In the absence of centralised planning, and in the more open-ended policy 
environment in which the energy sector now finds itself, it may well be, as suggested by Thérivel, et al 
(1992), that SEA can compensate to some degree for a lack of clearly-stated energy policy. However, 
attention needs to be focused more upon the strategic consequences of exploiting new or cheaper forms 
of energy, or market distortions through government promotion of renewables, rather than the possible 
outcomes of detailed, but imaginary, scenarios of electricity generation.  Questions remain, nonetheless, 
about where the responsibility for such SEA would lie, especially given the exclusion of policy-level SEA 
from the provisions of the European Union SEA Directive. 
 
Company-level Practice 
 
 The greatest potential for the development of SEA is likely to be within the domain of individual 
electricity companies, given that this is where institutional strength lies, created to some extent in 
opposition to that of competitors.  SEA could develop within this context, either as a stand-alone 
exercise, or possibly with reference to external policy-level SEA, in relation to the internal planning 
processes of individual companies.  It seems improbable that SEA could develop across corporate 
boundaries, despite the desirability of this from an integrated resource management perspective.  Being 
introduced into companies, however, subordinates SEA to their business objectives, and diminishes the 
more principled stance that it might enjoy in more public domains, such as in local authority planning. 
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In this context, SEA is likely to be driven, firstly, by the need for compliance with environmental 
regulations.  There are considerable uncertainties, however, about the extent to which SEA will become 
a legal requirement within the privatised electricity industry.  As far as the SEA Directive is concerned, 
plans and programmes to which it applies are limited to those that have official status.  They must be 
prepared by an ‘authority’, which certainly includes privatised utilities when carrying out statutory 
duties, such as providing electricity (EC 2003).  But only plans and programmes legally or administratively 
required need be assessed, and only if they set the framework for the future development consent of 
projects (EC 2001).  It is not clear, nor has government given guidance on, what plans and programmes 
currently prepared by electricity companies fulfil these criteria.  In Scotland, however, SEA requirements 
are being considerably extended beyond those of the Directive, to include SEA not just for plans and 
programmes, but also for ‘strategies’ (Scottish Executive 2003); the implications of this for the electricity 
industry are yet to be clarified.  
 
The second possible motivation for electricity companies to conduct SEA is that of good practice, a 
principle which is often advocated in SEA literature (eg. DETR 1998, Partidário 2000).  However, an 
appeal to good practice that is premised primarily on a sense of public responsibility is unlikely to carry 
the same weight within private business as within the public sector.  The notion of good practice is likely 
to fare better if linked to company objectives, or to corporate governance or stewardship.  Some 
informal experience of SEA within industry (forestry) has already underlined the potential of this 
approach (Noble 2004).  Here, SEA can be seen to contribute to the ‘deliverability’ of business solutions, 
and can offer some commercial advantage (Marshall 2003), although considerable advocacy may be 
required before senior staff are convinced of its possible value.  Can SEA assist, for example, in the 
gaining of consent for new development, or in the selection of alternatives that may be most acceptable 
to the widest range of stakeholders?  Given the uncertainty regarding the allowance of funding for 
environmental improvements, might SEA assist in justifying spending plans to the regulator? 
 
Similarly, SEA might be linked to practices and terminology which are already familiar; Noble & Storey 
(2001) suggest, for example, that SEA might result in the selection of the best practicable environmental 
option (BPEO), adopting a concept which already has widespread currency in industry.  Linkage might 
also be made with current issues facing the industry, such as the expected growth in renewables, with 
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difficulties ranging from accommodating small-scale plant in distribution networks to the development 
of major schemes in remote locations (DTI 2003a), with SEA playing a role in defining constraints and 
opportunities.  In other words, a relationship needs to be built up between SEA and the industry, in 
which SEA is incorporated into the language and processes of existing business practices (similar 
developments are observable in relation to other approaches to environmental management at the firm 
level (Jones & Mason 2002)).  There may also be potential for the development of a sustainability 
approach to SEA, in line with the implementation of the SEA Directive for planning in England (ODPM 
2004) that resonates more closely with the development of practice in broader corporate social 
responsibility. 
 
A distinction needs to be drawn in the possible application of SEA to the competitive components of the 
industry (generation and supply), and the regulated monopolies (transmission and distribution).  The 
competitive components are, by definition, more strongly driven by commercial opportunity, and tend 
therefore to operate within shorter time frames and more site-specific geographies; they could be said 
to act at less strategic levels.  An opportunity nonetheless exists for SEA to assist in plans for 
development, especially by generation companies.  For example, SEA could assist in establishing stronger 
environmental criteria to guide development opportunities.  Though the potential for SEA is greater with 
regard to the transmission and distribution companies: they have sole statutory responsibilities for the 
systems in their territories, and must maintain and operate reliable and technically integrated 
infrastructure across their licence areas. This provides a basis for strategic, future views of network 
capacity and development in the light of government policy and subject to formalised SEA.  This forward 
planning role is compromised, however, by the obligation upon transmission (and, in the case of some 
scale-scale generation, distribution) companies to respond to the commercial ventures of generation 
companies by connecting new plant to the transmission grid or electricity supply networks.  This places 
these companies in the position of having to react case-by-case to generation projects, a position that is 
not conducive to strategic planning.  In reality, they are able to take some degree of initiative by 
indicating to the generation industry where network capacity exists for increased generation, or indeed, 
by upgrading the network in anticipation of likely future generation development.  This is most probable 
where good potential for renewables has been identified, such as through current programmes within 
the UK’s three transmission companies - the England and Wales Transmission Study, and the wider UK-
based Renewable Energy Transmission Study (DTI 2003b). 
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Transmission and distribution licence holders are, in fact, required to prepare strategic plans setting out 
their intended work on their networks, which then act as guidance for generation interests.  These Seven 
Year Statements are the strategic planning activity that currently holds the most promise within the UK 
electricity industry for the application of an SEA process; they are also the documents relating to the 
industry which are most likely to fall within the scope of the SEA Directive.  It is here that SEA might best 
hope to find a toehold in the sector, acting as a catalyst for further and wider uptake (Marshall, 2003). 
 
Niche Strategic Environmental Assessment 
 
There needs to be recognition, therefore, of the difficulties presented by the break-up of the industry for 
the introduction of a tool, the purpose of which is to engage with the industry’s activities as a whole.  In 
their comparative study of the energy and water sectors, Byron & Sheate (1997) suggested that the 
greater fragmentation of the electricity industry, and the drive towards a competitive market, militated 
against the uptake of SEA.  SEA procedures are therefore most likely to become established in the 
privatised electricity industry in an incremental and piece-meal fashion, in association with 
plan/programme-making activities that have little interconnection across the industry, but that relate 
directly to the internal strategies of individual companies.  Some coherence may be provided by 
reference to public policy, but the emphasis is likely to be upon ‘niche’ SEAs, such as of studies of 
renewables potential, or major programmes of regional network refurbishment.  Within the possible 
constraints of SEA regulations, this is likely to favour more adaptive SEA methodologies, with less 
concern for universal, prescriptive approaches, and greater responsiveness to the specificities of 
strategic actions and planning processes (Partidário 1999, 2000, Verheem & Tonk 2000).   
 
This rather atomised approach might be seen as undermining one of the perceived benefits of SEA, 
which is to provide a comprehensive and integrated analysis of a sphere of activity, including the 
consideration of any cumulative effects that may arise (Fischer 1999).  It is in this sense that SEA has 
been held up as a means of addressing the disjointed nature of electricity infrastructure planning 
resulting from privatisation; for example, one cause célèbre involved the approval of a major power 
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station with no apparent thought given to the associated need for a major, environmentally-damaging 
transmission line (Sheate 1995).  (It should be noted that consents for generation and connection are 
now considered together (DTI 2000)).  If, as seems probable, business-level SEA is to remain as 
disaggregated as the industry itself, there is an argument for a higher, framework level of SEA – not of a 
strongly interventionist kind that would run counter to the principles of privatisation, but one that could 
provide some degree of guidance for company strategies.  Central government energy policy clearly 
provides one context for this, as discussed above.  There is also the possibility of more overarching SEAs 
being located at the level of industry regulators.  Although the primary purpose of regulators is to 
maximise the economic benefits of privatisation, by ensuring that effective competition is created and 
maintained, regulators have also been charged with some social and environmental responsibilities 
(Geradin 2001).  In the UK, Ofgem, the regulatory body, has started to place greater emphasis on 
environmental considerations, suggesting, for example, that it could take into greater account 
externalities, such as pollution costs, when setting prices (Ofgem 2001) – though it remains insistent that 
policy direction of this kind must come from central government (Cowell, 2004).  Nonetheless, Ofgem 
has started to carry out environmental assessment of its own administrative initiatives, such as the new 
trading arrangements (Ofgem 2003).  This may well form the basis for a more structured SEA process, 
and also draw further attention to SEA from the industry as a whole. 
 
Finally, there is scope for SEA at a more localised scale through which the activities and interactions of 
different players can be considered.  In the UK, regional planning holds the potential for providing a 
context within which the interlocking components of the industry can be viewed and future possible 
trajectories assessed (indeed, the government has recently announced its intention to bring about 
regional energy strategies, though it is not yet clear what form these may take (DTI 2003a)).   It is 
conceivable that regional spatial strategies, which are now required under the reformed planning 
system, could incorporate sectoral exercises of this kind.  It is also worth noting that electricity 
companies may be involved as non-statutory consultees in the SEAs that local and regional governments 
will be carrying out of their own plans and programmes under the SEA Directive, adding to the industry’s 
own awareness of SEA processes, and assisting the normalisation of SEA as a practice within companies. 
 
 
SEA in the Privatised Electricity Industry 
 17
Conclusions 
 
The privatisation of state-owned enterprises has taken many forms over the last two decades, ranging 
from limited provision of private sector capital, to the complete transfer of assets to privately-owned 
companies.  It may or may not be accompanied by deregulation (the removal of rules hindering 
competition) and liberalisation (the creation of competitive markets) of the activity concerned.  But the 
underlying theme of privatisation is the insertion of market forces in utilities that had, through 
programmes of nationalisation, for instance, been characterised by central planning and notions of 
public service (Ernst 1994, Robinson 2000).  Privatisation of the UK electricity industry provides a 
particularly striking example of this shift to stronger economic objectives being exercised in an 
increasingly competitive environment, and the loss of co-ordinated and public-interest driven 
infrastructure planning, which has often been hailed as the reduction of ‘government interference’ 
(Thomas 1996b).  The prospects for the assimilation of SEA rationale and practice into privatised settings 
might therefore seem unpromising.  By being conceptualised as an accompaniment to clearly-defined, 
authorised planning processes, which it seeks to inform and influence (eg. Thérivel & Partidário 1996), 
SEA will struggle to find a place in contexts where strategic planning itself has become inherently difficult 
and weakened; its role is clearly called into question if the processes it seeks to assess are themselves ill-
defined and hard to locate.  This obstacle might be overcome to some extent, in that SEA has 
demonstrated that it can adjust to a far more diverse range of settings and decision-making activities 
than those originally envisaged (Partidário & Clark 2000).  This has driven a conceptual shift away from 
prescriptive procedures to the adoption of more generic principles and the more flexible use of 
assessment tools (Verheem & Tonk 2000, Brown & Thérivel 2000).  The freedom to ‘tailor’ SEA to 
individual contexts may well assist the application of SEA to the disconnected elements of planning 
activity that do exist within the restructured industry, but SEA, given its presumption of strategic 
pathways that need assessing, will have some difficulty finding a place within the disjointed structures of 
radically privatised enterprises like the UK electricity industry. 
 
However, even if privatisation is defined as the withdrawal of state intervention from previously public-
owned enterprises, it has, in practice, been accompanied by continuing, watchful regulation, especially 
where public utility services remain at stake.  Regulators have been set up primarily to oversee the 
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efficiency improvements that privatisation seeks to achieve, especially where residual monopolies are 
being operated.  But they have also turned to other societal objectives; for example, attention has 
recently been given by the UK electricity regulator to questions of social equity (MacKerron 2003).  
Environmental concerns have also been addressed through broader environmental regulation, raising 
significant questions about the privatisation of electricity generation, for instance (Vickers & Yarrow 
1994).  Clear policy directions are also emerging in relation to select environmental issues, especially to 
do with climate change and the development of renewable sources of energy, with various associated 
regulatory mechanisms being proposed (DTI 2003a).  Even in the UK, therefore, with one of the most 
liberalised forms of privatisation of the energy sector in the world, government intervention remains; it 
even appears in some respects, including environmental protection, to be on the increase. Although this 
is far from a reassertion of comprehensive, centralized planning, it can be said that in some respects, 
deregulation has been followed by re-regulation (Feigenbaum et al 1998).  And though this may be seen 
as a retrograde step from the perspective of market economics (Robinson 2000), it does provide 
opportunities for environmental management tools, like SEA, to find a place, not just in the strict 
confines of compliance, but in the wider policy and regulatory frameworks that are evolving as an 
inescapable feature of privatisation.  This potential relies, however, on SEA connecting directly with the 
issues and priorities expressed in those frameworks, and building up a relationship with the industry’s 
direct interests, rather than necessarily attempting comprehensive, technically-driven assessments of 
the industry’s activities; the use of objectives-led approaches to SEA would clearly be of value here. 
 
The increasingly privatised landscape of national economies, including the provision of essential services, 
does not therefore appear to be overwhelmingly hostile to the introduction of processes, like SEA, that 
aim to ensure that far-reaching industrial activities retain consideration of the environmental impacts of 
their activities.  The freeing of the economic conditions within which sectors like the electricity industry 
now operate has not resulted in an abandonment of constraints, and both social and environmental 
controls have come to the fore via stakeholder pressures, as well as various policy and regulatory tools.   
Indeed, it could be argued that privatised companies require stronger, rather than looser, forms of 
regulation in these areas.  There are, however, significant difficulties facing the integration of SEA into 
restructured and de-integrated industries, and into companies now prioritising business objectives as 
much as any residual public service responsibilities they may have.  There is a need here for SEA to be 
clearly linked to those objectives, and to build on existing environmental management principles and 
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practices within industry.  There is also the potential for SEA, by virtue of its strategic level of interest, to 
draw upon, and inform corporate environmental policy and to direct corporate governance.  It is to be 
hoped that SEA will also contribute to efforts to coordinate and integrate activities beyond company 
boundaries through higher levels of policy-making, including regional planning, and to ensure improving 
environmental conditions through the regulatory control of privatised enterprises. 
 
 
Note 
 
1
  The electricity industry consists of three major, interconnected physical components (often portrayed 
as a vertical hierarchy): generation, the production of electricity by various means, including the 
consumption of fossil fuel reserves in power stations, and the exploitation of renewable energy sources; 
transmission, the long-distance transfer of electricity at very high voltage, usually on large-scale 
overhead power lines; and distribution, the more localised, lower voltage transfer of electricity to 
consumers, via overhead lines and underground cables.  Transmission and distribution networks are 
often referred to as grid systems.  Finally, supply generally refers to the sale of electricity to consumers. 
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